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MAGNA CARTA, THE INTERSTICES OF PROCEDURE, AND GUANTÁNAMO
Larry May*
This paper is inspired by two events, seven hundred and eighty-eight years 
apart. The first is the signing of Magna Carta in 1215 and the second is the 
establishment of U.S. prisons at Guantánamo and Bagram in 2003. It may 
seem odd to link these two events, but I do not think it is odd at all. Magna 
Carta established that any person is entitled to due process 
of law. Guantánamo and Bagram stand for the idea that certain prisoners 
can be denied due process if they fall through the cracks in the various 
extant legal regimes. Magna Carta was an agreement extracted from King 
John of England by feudal barons. We need an international agreement 
that protects Magna Carta legacy rights so that detainees will not fall 
through the cracks and be deprived of their procedural rights as they were 
at Guantánamo.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will explain how an understanding of Magna Carta in
1215 might provide an intriguing model for understanding “global proce-
dural justice.” The story of how Magna Carta influenced English law gives 
us a model, but also a cautionary tale, of how international law may develop 
as well. The process was a very slow and gradual one, and the process 
largely proceeded through gap filling, especially in the domain of procedur-
al rights rather than substantive ones. Magna Carta laid the groundwork for 
English rule of law by laying out basic procedures that had to be followed, 
including procedures for challenging arbitrary imprisonment or exile. These 
procedural rights opened the door for the kind of equitable review of poten-
tially arbitrary use of power by courts and even by the King, so that other 
more substantive abuses could be exposed and condemned as well. In this 
way, even as significant substantive rights were lacking in the legal system, 
procedural rights became gap fillers. Accountability was the main thing 
accomplished by Magna Carta and that then led to the possibility of a cen-
tralized system of law enforcement across England, just as may be true 
some day with international law. The process required significant input 
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from Parliament, which extended and solidified Magna Carta’s rights. Be-
cause there is no international legislature, other legal institutions will have 
to play the role of Parliament in extending basic procedural rights globally.1
In the first section of this paper, I will explain what the rights are 
that were first described at the time of Magna Carta and how they were ab-
ridged in Guantánamo. In section two, I provide some historical background 
on Magna Carta, rehearsing a story that by now has achieved wide consen-
sus among historians. In the third section, I will explain why it was that 
Magna Carta’s rights came to be considered fundamental law in England, 
and why it is especially important that fundamental law be understood in 
procedural terms for the development of the rule of law. In the fourth sec-
tion, I draw out some parallels between the development of a legal system 
in England from the time of Magna Carta and the development of an inter-
national legal system today. In the fourth section, I explain some of the 
changes in international law that would be especially important for 
the eventual creation of a truly international legal system, again drawing on 
the model of Magna Carta. And in the final section, I respond to several 
objections. 
I. MAGNA CARTA’S LEGACY AND GUANTÁNAMO
Magna Carta’s Chapter 39 (normally referred to as Chapter 29, in 
the 1225 revised version of King Henry III) says:
No freeman shall be taken and imprisoned or disseised . . . or outlawed, or 
exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.2
There are at least four distinct rights in this document. 
First, is the right to trial by jury, which is so important that the other 
rights cannot be abridged unless a jury determines that such abridgement is 
justified. Second, is what came to be called the right of habeas corpus, the 
right not to be arbitrarily imprisoned. Third, is the right not to be disseised, 
which meant the right not to be arbitrarily dispossessed or deprived of citi-
zenship rights, including the rights to certain “of any free tenement or of his 
liberties or free customs . . . .”3
1 I am grateful for David Konig’s help on some of these historical issues.
And fourth, is the right not to be outlawed or 
exiled arbitrarily, at least in part what is today called the right of nonre-
foulement, namely the right not to be arbitrarily sent out of a country where 
one resided to another country where one was likely to be harmed. These 
rights, including the vaguer right not to be destroyed in any other way, are 
2 FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION 68 (1948).
3 This wording was added in the 1225 version of Magna Carta. See id.
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the core rights that were thought to be necessary to protect any substantive 
freedoms. For if one could be arbitrarily sent to prison, outlawed, or exiled, 
what good would substantive rights to property, or to receive compensation 
for military service, do.
At Guantánamo Bay, all four Magna Carta legacy rights were vi-
olated. The right of habeas corpus was denied to these prisoners. Several 
prisoners were sent from Guantánamo to countries that were known routine-
ly to use torture. The prisoners were described as being in a “legal black 
hole” in that they were neither within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts nor 
under the jurisdiction of the laws and customs of war, since they were un-
lawful combatants. And the prisoners at Guantánamo were denied trial by 
jury.
Of most significance for my study is the right not to be arbitrarily 
imprisoned, which is similar to the emerging right of habeas corpus. Brac-
ton clearly lists the writ in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 
1230), and specifies its form as follows:
[T]hat he produce his body [“et nunc praecipietur vicecomiti quod habeat 
corpus”] on another day by a writ of this kind: The king to the viscount 
greeting. We enjoin you before our justiciaries & C. on such a day the 
body of A., to answer to B. concerning such a plea . . . .4
Here we see the writ described as addressing the official who is detaining or 
jailing a person, requiring him or her merely to produce the body of the 
prisoner and provide an answer concerning why the prisoner should contin-
ue to be deprived of his or her freedom. So, the right of habeas corpus is not 
a “get out of jail free” card, but only a right to be brought out of the dunge-
on quite temporarily, where it may be that one is then subjected again to 
incarceration and suffering soon thereafter. 
The folk history of habeas corpus has it that there are three things 
that are important about this right. First, the body must be produced to dem-
onstrate that the person has not merely been killed. Second, bringing the 
body into the light of day allows one to see if there are marks on the body 
indicating torture or other forms of physical abuse. Third, the public reading 
of the charges against the prisoner is meant to act as a deterrent against arbi-
trary or unlawful incarceration. It is the third factor that is often said to be 
the most important as a cornerstone of all other rights. 
But habeas corpus also meant more than merely being brought out 
of the dungeon to have the charges against one read publicly. For another 
key phrase of Bracton’s formulation of the writ of habeas corpus is “before 
4 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 16 (1980) (quot-
ing BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 474–75 (Sir Travis Twiss ed., 
1883)).
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our justiciaries”.5
Today, habeas corpus in the U.S. means much more than the rudi-
mentary concerns I have been discussing, and includes an examination of 
any violations of a person’s constitutional rights. Federal habeas corpus 
cases are collateral attacks on the constitutional firmness of the conviction 
that caused the prisoner to be incarcerated. Surprisingly, perhaps, innocence 
is a controversial basis for a successful habeas appeal. Typically when one 
is successful, the remedy is either a retrial or out-right exoneration and free-
dom from incarceration. The leading scholars of habeas corpus law in the 
U.S. call habeas “[a] civil, appellate, equitable, common law, and statutory 
procedure.”
The phrase is sufficiently ambiguous that it could mean 
several different things. But there is one meaning that would fit nicely with 
a somewhat expanded notion of habeas, beyond merely the minimalist in-
terpretation, and that is that the reading of the public charges must be in the 
context of some kind of hearing, before a judicial official, and not merely 
before the public. 
6 Hertz and Liebman go on to explain that habeas corpus has 
become a broad “surrogate for Supreme Court review”7 of whether the peti-
tioners “constitutional rights have been preserved.”8
In certain countries, those who are in prison may get out of prison 
and have the charges against them made public by filing a habeas corpus 
petition. For over eight hundred years in the English speaking world, the 
right to file such a petition has been sacrosanct.  Important legal theorists, 
such as William Blackstone, have said that this procedural right is the cor-
nerstone in the “preservation” of personal liberties, since without protection 
of habeas corpus a prisoner can be incarcerated in such a way that his or her 
“sufferings are unknown or forgotten.”9
There is some reason to think that historically the right not to be ar-
bitrarily exiled was meant to cover cases of being deported so as to be de-
prived of basic rights. In addition, Magna Carta’s Chapter 29 also speaks of 
the right not to be “disseised”.10 The term, disseised, meant the disposses-
sion of one’s property.11 The very next right is the right not to be exiled.12
5 See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 4 (quoting BRACTON, supra note 4, at 469).
Such a connection between these rights would constitute what is today 
6 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (2001) (1988).
7 Id. § 2.4.
8 Id. § 2.5 at 86 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 
86, 87–88 (1923)).
9 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 132 (1979) (1765).
10 See THOMPSON, supra note 2.
11 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (8th ed. 2004) (defining disseise as “to wrongfully 
deprive (a person) of the freehold possession of property.”).
12 See THOMPSON, supra note 2.
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called nonrefoulement. For one way to dispossess a person of property is to 
exile that person to a place where the person’s property rights would not be 
respected. Indeed, most forms of exile dispossess a person.
The underlying moral principle of the right of nonrefoulement, and 
the larger rubric of rendition cases that nonrefoulement falls under, is that 
no one be forced to go to a State where his or her basic human rights are 
likely to be jeopardized. The current way that the right of nonrefoulement is 
characterized does not fit well with this underlying rationale, and can only 
be made to fit if there is an expansion of the domain of cases that fit under 
nonrefoulement. There is no in principle reason to restrict cases of nonre-
foulement to ones that involve group-based deprivation of individual rights. 
Being an outlaw was recognized at the time of Magna Carta as 
something that a person needed specific procedural protections against. In-
deed, there is a sense that the entire of Magna Carta’s famous Chapter 29 
could be understood as an attempt by the barons to extract from the King a 
set of guarantees that people in England would not be rendered as outlaws, 
even when they were legitimately confined to prison or sent back to their 
home countries. In international law, such a right is the right to be subject to 
the guarantees of human rights and hence not to lose one’s status as a rights 
bearer, and to be forced outside the protection of any legal system. It is my 
contention that such Magna Carta legacy rights are the backbone of a mi-
nimal respect for human rights generally and if recognized globally would 
significantly fill gaps in an international rule of law. And if such procedural 
rights are protected situations like Guantánamo would be less likely to hap-
pen again.
II. MAGNA CARTA AND ITS TWELFTH CENTURY BACKGROUND
In order to set the stage for understanding how Magna Carta might 
be a model for international law today, we need to understand what gave 
rise to Magna Carta. The first thing to note is that in twelfth century Eng-
land there was not a strongly centralized State. Indeed, if anything there was 
strong decentralized power. This decentralization took two significant 
forms. First, England was a feudal society, which meant that there were 
often quite strong feudal lords who reigned over large tracts of land in Eng-
land and many did not feel that they were less powerful or authoritative than 
the king himself. Second, there were also many courts and systems of courts 
that had various levels of autonomy and subject matter jurisdiction. 
England had had courts in existence for many years before Magna 
Carta. One type of older court was called “Courts of the Hundred”. These 
courts were generally held as open-air meetings in the territorial districts 
called hundreds, larger than villages but not as large as counties or shires. 
Judges administered the Salic law of the Franks in these courts, and there 
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was a kind of “manual of law and legal procedure for the use or guidance of 
free judges” of the Hundred Court.13 Here there was a “deliberate attempt to 
furnish an alternative to violence and bloodshed . . . .”14 These courts were 
autonomous of the king; the king “is merely represented in it by a class of 
officers who collect his share of the fines imposed . . . .”15 Only much later 
does “the popular president of the Hundred Court, the Thingman, disap-
pears, and his place is taken by the Graf or Count, the deputy of the King.”16
Here is how the distinguished historian Frederick Maitland de-
scribes the Twelfth Century legal scene: 
From the earliest of times, England had autonomous local courts, and this 
was still true at the time of Magna Carta.  
At the beginning of the twelfth century England was covered by an intri-
cate network of local courts. In the first place there were the ancient courts 
of the shires and the hundreds, courts older than feudalism, some of them 
older than the English kingdom. Many of the hundred courts had fallen in-
to private hands . . . . Above all these rose the king’s own court. It was 
destined to increase, while all the other courts were destined to decrease; 
but we must not think of it as a court of first instance for all litigants; ra-
ther it, like every other court, had its limited sphere of jurisdiction.17
And at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the jurist, Bracton, is “forced 
to make something like an apology for the activity of the king’s 
court . . . .”18
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there was great distrust for 
the king’s court, as well as for the king’s growing political and military 
power. Here is just one example of the difficulty faced by the growing 
strength of the crown:
The problem of local government, then, was fast taking a new form, name-
ly, how best to protect the weak from unjust fines and oppressions inflicted 
on them by local magistrates. The sheriff’s local power was no longer a 
source of danger to the monarch, but had become an effective part of the 
machinery which enabled the Crown to levy with impunity its always in-
creasing taxation.19
13 HENRY MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 168 (1886).
14 Id. at 169.
15 Id. at 171.
16 Id. at 172.
17 FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 10 (A.H. Chaytor & 
W.J. Whittaker eds., 1971) (1909).
18 Id. at 12.
19 WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER 
OF KING JOHN 15 (1914).
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King John and the feudal barons had been warring about such matters for 
several years when things came to a crisis point. The barons refused to pay 
the king’s taxes or to provide him with soldiers to fight for lands in Nor-
mandy that the king claimed as his by right. By the time of Magna Carta, 
the barons were in open rebellion and King “John found himself, for the 
moment, without power of effective resistance . . . .”20 The barons “asked a 
plain acceptance of their plainly expressed demands” and King John was 
“constrained to surrender . . . .”21
Magna Carta was a charter, a kind of compact, drafted on June 15, 
1215 and agreed to by the feudal lords on one side and King John on the 
other. The compact comes to take on mythical proportions by the seven-
teenth century, especially due to the writings of Edward Coke. But it is not 
terribly controversial to say that Magna Carta was originally thought of as 
an agreement between parties that were roughly de facto equal in order to 
help dispel distrust and provide for harmonious relations within England. As 
one historian put it: “The barons on that day renewed their oaths of fealty 
and homage: this was the stipulated price of ‘the liberties.’”22
King John bristled under the terms of the charter and tried to extri-
cate himself from its terms by enlisting the aid of the Vatican, which at-
tempted to annul Magna Carta. But events intruded, making quite a differ-
ence. Here is William McKechnie’s analysis:
Magna Carta, 
the Great Charter between King John and the feudal barons, was primarily a 
bargain struck so that the king could retain his crown and the barons could 
get assurances that the king would stop abusing his power. Both parties paid 
a high price to get what they desired from the compact. Initially, Magna 
Carta did not appear to be anything other than an agreement struck between 
the leaders of England in the very early years of the thirteenth century.
At a critical juncture, when fortune still trembled in the balance, John’s 
death at Newark Castle, on the morning of 19th October, 1216, altered the 
situation, rendering possible, and indeed inevitable, a new arrangement of 
parties and forces in England. The heir to the throne was an infant, whose 
advisers found it prudent to reissue voluntarily, and to accept as their rule 
of government, the essential principles of the Charter that had been ex-
torted from the unwilling John.23
So, in the very early years after its adoption the character of the charter 
changed.
Magna Carta was an agreement between semi-autonomous feudal 
lords and the king, and was in some respects like a multilateral treaty among 
20 Id. at 35.
21 Id. at 38.
22 Id. at 40.
23 Id. at 47.
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sovereign States, and indeed I will later look to the way that Magna Carta 
may help us in understanding such treaties. But Magna Carta as a historical 
document probably would not have had such an enormous impact if not for 
the fact that successive kings and parliaments continued to reaffirm it, each 
time allowing the Great Charter to live up to its name by both expanding its 
reach and confirming its permanency. The seventeenth century jurist, Ed-
ward Coke, claims that there were twenty-nine reaffirmations of Magna 
Carta from 1215 to the early seventeenth century.24
What is often cited as the most important provision of Magna Carta, 
and that which is closest to a provision of the American Constitution, is 
Chapter 29:
By the early seventeenth 
century the charter was said to have established fundamental or constitu-
tional law in England, despite its humble original meaning. Over time, the 
charter or “treaty” was expanded in scope and jurisdiction, and given a life 
of its own that would be the basis of many other founding documents such 
as the American Bill of Rights.
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or desseised or exiled or out-
lawed or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
These liberties are described at the beginning of Magna Carta, in Chapter 1, 
“to have and to hold to them and their Heirs, of Us and our Heirs for ev-
er.”25
The phrase, “by the law of the land”, came to be understood as “due 
process of law” by the fourteenth century. Indeed, Magna Carta is now so 
closely associated with due process rights that it is a bit of a shock to realize 
that the term “due process” does not appear in Magna Carta, except in this 
wide interpretation of the phrase “by the law of the land”. The first explicit 
mention of due process of law as an interpretation of Magna Carta’s Chap-
ter 29 (39) seems to be in 1352 with the second of the six statutes during 
Edward III’s rule:
This supposedly fundamental character of being final and immemorial 
probably did much to cement the importance of Magna Carta when the doc-
ument was referred to over the centuries.    
Whereas it is contained in the Great Charter of the Liberties of England, 
that none shall be imprisoned . . . unless it be by indictment of good and 
lawful people of the same neighbourhood where such deeds be done, in 
24 THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 9–10. Faith Thompson, a contemporary historian, corrects 
this figure upward to a total of forty-four including both parliamentary and royal decrees of 
affirmation of Magna Carta. Id. at 10.
25 Note that this wording also conveys the idea that the Charter initially only applied to 
those who signed and their heirs, not to all of the living in England.
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due manner, or by process made by writ original at the common law . . . 
.26
Thus, in just a few years, Magna Carta is cited to stand for the right of due 
process in a number of English statutes and cases, even though the phrase 
itself does not appear there.27
III. PRECONDITIONS FOR THE RULE OF LAW
It is not at all clear that this is what was fore-
most on the minds of the barons who sued to get the king to agree to this 
compact. Yet, even as the phrase habeas corpus also does not appear in 
Magna Carta either, surely the root idea barring arbitrary imprisonment is 
there in Chapter 29 (39).
The rights contained in Chapter 29 (39) of Magna Carta are what 
are sometimes referred to as fundamental law. It is interesting to speculate, 
as I will do in subsequent sections, how such fundamental law could serve 
as a model for international law today. A number of historians, including 
Holdsworth, date the idea of habeas corpus to an earlier time than Magna 
Carta. And interestingly, the earliest uses of habeas corpus also do not stand 
for such a broad right as due process, but only for the right to challenge 
one’s imprisonment, a purely procedural right. Such rights do not specify 
any right to a particular form of treatment or liberty that the State must pro-
tect. Rather these rights are simply what minimally must be done so that 
arbitrariness does not creep into the way that people are deprived of their 
liberty by being incarcerated, outlawed or exiled. What is not initially clear, 
but what I will explore in the next sections, is how pure procedural rights 
could come to be thought of as fundamental or constitutional law. 
By the time of the seventeenth century, those who defended limita-
tions on sovereignty found in Magna Carta a symbolic way to make their 
case that customary rights formed an immemorial law that restricted the 
prerogative of kings. As Pocock said:
In this way there grew up—or rather, there was intensified and renewed—
a habit in many counties of appealing to “the ancient constitution”, of 
seeking to prove that the rights it was desired to defend were immemorial 
and therefore beyond the king’s power to alter or annul.28
These rights were imbued with a power stronger than reason, namely im-
memorial custom that no one could deny. Nonetheless, Edward Coke chose 
to add to the legitimacy of Magna Carta’s rights the fact that many times 
26 THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 91 (emphasis added). Faith Thompson claims that this is the 
first mention of due process in the context of Magna Carta. See id. at 92. 
27 See id.
28 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF 
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 16 (1957).
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Parliament had affirmed them as checks against sovereign prerogative, and 
he also appealed to the fact that an early English king had voluntarily re-
strained himself in conformity with these ancient rights.29
The great rights in Chapter 29 (39) of Magna Carta are best seen as 
procedural rights.
Thus the great 
rights of Magna Carta were not merely legitimated by the Charter but more 
importantly by immemorial custom, a moral constitution, which in effect is 
merely expressed in the Charter rather than founded by it. 
30 They are not themselves what people normally mean by 
“due process rights” and they are not those listed in the canonical treatment 
of the rule of law by Lon Fuller.31 Fuller does mention habeas corpus in 
passing, as part of the congruence between official action and declared rule. 
He lists this right along with the right to appeal, not as part of “procedural 
due process,” but as rights “in part directed toward the same objective” as 
due process, in that lack of such rights can contribute to a broken or arbi-
trary system.32
Perhaps the provisions of Magna Carta’s Chapter 29 (39) should be 
seen as “purely procedural”, but in any event they are not substantive in the 
normal sense of the term since they do not secure any particular liberty. 
Purely procedural rights would be those that are necessary for the efficacy 
of procedural rights, but do not have the normal features of being procedural 
themselves. Habeas corpus says only that there must be some ability of a 
prisoner to be made visible, to get his case reviewed, and this right can act 
in a way to deter the most egregious forms of arbitrariness. But it does not 
specify what that procedure should be. Nonetheless, I will generally contin-
ue to talk about these rights as procedural, but one should note that I do 
recognize the distinction between procedural rights that are a precondition 
even for other procedural rights, and procedural rights that are not a precon-
dition for other rights.
This seems right, if a bit more understated than I will put it 
later. 
When the struggles over English sovereignty took place in the se-
venteenth century, the part of Magna Carta that people fixed on were these 
rights in Chapter 29 (39).33
Thus the Habeas Corpus Act [1679] provides heavy money penalties 
against all who offend against its provisions: e.g., judges who refuse to is-
Here is how a distinguished legal scholar cha-
racterizes this later development:
29 See id. at 44–45.
30 See THOMPSON, supra note 2.
31 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (rev. ed. 1969). See also Larry May, 
International Law and the Inner Morality of Law, in THE HART/FULLER DEBATE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (forthcoming 2010).
32 FULLER, supra note 31, at 81–82.
33 See THOMPSON, supra note 2.
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sue the writ, officers who send a prisoner out of England. The right of the 
penalty is a private right, enforceable like any debt; and the King has no 
power to pardon, at any rate, after the proceedings have been commenced. 
In other cases the right of action is given to the “common informer,” that 
is, any member of the public who chooses to take proceedings; in others, 
again, to some corporation which represents professional interests, such as 
the Law Society or Goldsmiths’ Company.34
The provisions of Chapter 29 (39) were seen as crucial for “enforcing the 
law” especially for making sure that the legal rights were not denied by spi-
riting a potentially complaining party away, either into jail or out of the 
country altogether. No rights would be secured without these rights of ha-
beas corpus and other similar rights enforced. 
Consider for instance the practice of basing conviction merely on 
the King’s claim of “notoriety” of the deeds of the accused. Magna Carta 
was cited to show that there must be some kind of judicial proceedings, with 
the accused present, for conviction and execution to be lawful.35 What 
transpired over the centuries after Magna Carta was “the long, slow pro-
gression toward the ‘rule of law.’”36 Even kings, such as King Edward II, 
would declare that they could not act “contrary to Magna Carta and the 
common law of the realm”,37
Henry Maine well stated the most important point I am trying to es-
tablish in this section:
although initially kings used the cover of 
Magna Carta to rule in ways they wanted to on other grounds. Procedure 
was incredibly important in giving legitimacy to what would otherwise 
seem to be controversial, even for those who were kings.
So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts 
of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually se-
creted in the interstices of procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the 
law through the envelope of its technical forms.38
The substantive rights of liberty, especially the right to be free in one’s bo-
dily movements, are indeed first approached in a system of law that moved 
beyond the purely local, in this somewhat surprising way. Perhaps, a similar 
kind of move can be made in international law today. Rather than focusing 
directly on substantive rights, perhaps it is procedural rights, such as habeas 
corpus that we should turn to, since the substantive rights developed much 
more slowly in medieval English legal debates.
34 W. M. GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW 238–39 (1911).
35 See THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 73.
36 Id. at 84.
37 Id.
38 HENRY MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1886).
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It is also true that many other types of early law, including Irish and 
Indian legal systems, give “an extraordinary prominence” to procedure.39
When early legal systems focus on procedure they display an awareness that 
what is most important is that “service to mankind was to furnish an alterna-
tive to savagery, not to suppress it wholly” by limiting but still partially 
allowing private remedies.40 As long as the appropriate procedures are fol-
lowed, these private remedies were important since early tribunals often 
lacked the “power of directly enforcing their own decrees.” 41
Maitland tells us how the forms of action were absolutely crucial in 
determining whether there even was a wrong that had been committed.
Procedures, 
like those that set limits on the arbitrary use of power, nonetheless allow a 
wide variety of enforcement mechanisms, something that is especially im-
portant when there is no centralized sovereign power, as of course is true of 
international law today.
42 As 
Maitland put it, one didn’t see a wrong and then look for a form of action, 
but one first had to find a form of action before there was any wrong that 
was legally actionable.43 Maitland also explains how the growing impor-
tance and consolidation of forms of action contributed to the gradual in-
crease in sovereign power within England.44
Had the worst come to the worst the king might have claimed these things, 
jurisdiction over his own immediate tenants, jurisdiction when all lords 
have made default, a few specialty royal pleas known as pleas of the 
crown. To this he might have been reduced by feudalism. . . . That his 
court should fling open its doors to all litigants . . . is a principle that only 
slowly gains ground.
Here is how he characterized 
the incremental move toward centralized sovereignty:
45
Magna Carta did not instantly transform English legal culture into a centra-
lized system. Instead, procedural consolidation merely set the stage by re-
stricting the form of law so that later a consolidation of substance could 
proceed. Indeed, the whole process took at least four centuries, and to a 
certain extent has not ended yet.
There is no doubt, though, that Magna Carta came to be seen as 
hugely important. A. E. Dick Howard makes the point quite succinctly, if 
quite controversially:
39 See id. at 374, 386.
40 Id. at 387.
41 Id. 
42 See MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 2–5.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 11. 
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By the end of the fourteenth century, Magna Carta had established itself as 
more than simply a venerable statute; by then it was fundamental law. In 
1368, for example, a statute of Edward III commanded that the “Great 
Charter and the Charter of the Forest be holden and kept in all Points; and 
if there be any Statute made to the contrary, it shall be holden for none.” 
Here we see Magna Carta treated as a superstatute, in other words as a 
constitution . . . an obvious similarity to the language of the American 
Constitution . . . and to the doctrine of judicial review.46
Parallels to the Rome Statute are also apt.
IV. PARALLELS BETWEEN MAGNA CARTA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this section, I will discuss some of the parallels between the de-
velopment of English law after Magna Carta and the development of inter-
national law after the end of the Cold War. I am interested in the parallels 
between the way the semi-autonomous feudal barons and their courts were 
eventually brought together under a single umbrella of English sovereign 
law, and the way that the sovereign States and their legal systems are very 
slowly being brought under the umbrella of a system of international law in 
the twenty-first century. In both cases, what was sought was a way to make 
it less likely that individuals fall through the cracks and have no forum 
where abuse of their rights can be redressed. 
First, there is an interesting parallel in the way that provisions of 
Magna Carta were enforced and the way enforcement works in international 
law. Recall that initially there were both public enforcement mechanisms 
and also several types of private enforcement. Universal jurisdiction in in-
ternational criminal law has meant also various forms of universal prosecu-
tion and punishment, that is, where any State that has the wherewithal can 
prosecute and attempt to punish flagrant human rights violations such as 
those that occur in genocide or crimes against humanity, or in Grave 
Breaches of the rules of war. It is interesting to contemplate what it would 
mean to have truly private outsourcing of enforcement of international crim-
inal law. Perhaps think of private bounty hunters who would attempt to find 
and bring to The Hague indicted political leaders. But at the moment, things 
are less radical in that the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) principle of 
complementarity allows for multiple trial forums and also for multiple en-
forcement mechanisms, while still providing the beginnings of a uniformity 
to such trials. 
Second, there is a parallel concerning the development of jurisdic-
tion. Perhaps it was inevitable that when the ICC opened its doors seeming-
ly to all litigants, it would be seen as moving too quickly as well, at least by 
the U.S. and other major powers like China. If the progress of international 
46 A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 24–25 (1998) (1964).
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criminal law takes four centuries, or even eight centuries, I would not be 
surprised. In the mean time, as also in the case of Magna Carta, changes are 
occurring nonetheless even though they do not constitute a complete break 
with the past. And as time passes slowly in this progress, it is the procedural 
provisions that may do the most work, by filling gaps in the substantive 
system of rules. So there are two issues:  who is to be addressed by a system 
of law, and what are the types of norm that the law seeks to enforce. In both 
cases, we are at the very beginning of a recognition that international law 
might someday address all people concerning a variety of causes of action, 
just as was claimed to be true at the time of Magna Carta, but where the 
realization of this goal took a very long time.
Third, what is “secreted in the interstices of procedure” may indeed 
fill the gaps left because of an incomplete system of substantive rights in 
international law, just as Sir Henry Maine said was true of the time of Mag-
na Carta.47
Fourth, Chapter 29 (39) of Magna Carta
I have in mind that the recognition of such things as an interna-
tional right to habeas corpus could stand-in for due process considerations 
that may come to include even substantive due process. Indeed, the line 
between procedural due process and substantive due process is often hard to 
draw. Substantive norms are concerned with the proper aims or ends to be 
sought by legal rules. Procedural norms have to do with what makes some-
thing a rule, or a system of rules, in the first place. “Purely procedural” 
norms may be different yet, having to do with enforcement of the norms of 
both sorts set out above. 
48
47 See MAINE, supra note 38.
and other early forerun-
ners of due process did at least two significant things: the elimination of the 
most egregious forms of arbitrary power over individuals, and the harness-
ing of various forms of private enforcement mechanisms in the service of a 
single conception of justice. It is easy to see how international criminal pro-
cedures today have been accomplishing these goals as well, even if only in a 
still preliminary way. The diminishing of arbitrariness has mainly come in 
the form of prosecutions of those who would otherwise achieve impunity. 
But surely another way would be for international criminal tribunals to hold 
out the prospect of intervention to deal with arbitrary incarceration and de-
portation, as was one of the chief goals of the famous Chapter 29 (39) of 
Magna Carta. Another way that international criminal tribunals are having 
an effect is in the harnessing of “private” enforcement mechanisms so that 
international tribunals do not have to provide such enforcement themselves, 
which would be well beyond their means, as was also true of the beginning 
of the King’s courts in England just after Magna Carta. 
48 See THOMPSON, supra note 2.
2009] MAGNA CARTA 105
I must enter a cautionary caveat about the use of “private” enforce-
ment mechanisms. There was a worry that the private enforcement mechan-
isms at the time of Magna Carta, and this included the way even criminal 
trials proceeded, could abuse the system for personal revenge or gain, espe-
cially concerning the use of “common informers”. Similarly, today we 
should worry about prosecutors in Spain and Belgium who take upon them-
selves the task of enforcing international criminal law, with a similar possi-
bility of abuse. Vigilante justice is the term most often used for the abuse 
of these types of “private” enforcement of the norms of international 
criminal law.
But there is a sense of “private” enforcement that was less contro-
versial at the time of Magna Carta and the first centuries after its adoption, 
even as it was still a source of some abuse. The Law Society monitored and 
enforced standards of professional conduct of lawyers, and the Goldsmiths’ 
Company performed a similar task concerning the enforcement of statutes 
regulating the weighing and sale of gold and silver, as well as the general 
professional standards of goldsmiths in England. In both cases, these private 
groups were given the right to enforce the statutory standards against their 
members, with due penalties as well. Such systems of private enforcement 
have their parallels in the systems of private arbitration and dispute resolu-
tion in international law that has the blessing of the various international 
tribunals and political bodies in international law.
Despite some reservations, I would also endorse the more robust 
way that international law has incorporated the municipal courts of States 
into the system of enforcement of international law. The English political 
leaders at the time of Magna Carta realized that it would be a huge mistake 
to try to dismantle the local courts in favor of national courts. Instead, as I 
have indicated, the King gradually inserted himself into these local courts, 
eventually replacing the Thingmen and other local magistrates with those 
who were employees of the crown. But this process took a very long time, 
and in the period during transition the King simply exercised a bit of over-
sight and collected fees from these courts, rather than disbanding them or 
taking them over completely. The transition was a gradual and largely un-
controversial one, at least after the death of King John and the subsequent 
reaffirmations of Magna Carta discussed earlier. It has been important that 
international tribunals have been composed of judges from throughout the 
world as a way to indicate that the tribunals are not merely Western at-
tempts at hegemony.
In addition, the ICC, for instance, has not sought to abrogate the 
right of State courts to prosecute individuals for international crimes such as 
genocide and crimes against humanity. Indeed, the court’s principle of 
complementarity specifically allows for States to prosecute and only asserts 
the Court’s jurisdiction when a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute 
international crimes through its own courts. So far, such a system has made 
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the ICC not nearly as controversial as one might otherwise have predicted. 
The experience of Magna Carta is that a gradual process is needed in such a 
transformation. The king’s sheriff intrudes gradually into a local process 
that is otherwise left pretty much unchanged. This experience helps explain 
why a similar process in international law is much less controversial than 
might have been anticipated.
The experience of the reception of Magna Carta in England can 
help us understand the recent reception of the internationalization of crimi-
nal courts. One cannot stress enough though how historical events can make 
such a difference in an otherwise seemingly impossible situation. If King 
John had not died a year after Magna Carta, he would have continued to 
resist the reforms of the barons. And if the Cold War had not come to an 
end, the Security Council would have remained stalemated in its attempt to 
form international tribunals. Of course, gradualism is one of the key lessons. 
But one can be a good bit more specific by looking at parallels between 
aspects of the reception of Magna Carta and the reception of international 
multi-lateral treaties like the ICC’s Rome Statute.  In the next sections, I 
will also offer some thoughts about what needs to happen next in interna-
tional law for the idea of procedural protections to go forward and for new 
international institutions to develop in spite of the lack of international go-
vernance structures.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Magna Carta was a compact in 1215 that was somewhat similar to 
the ICC’s Rome Statute that was a multi-lateral treaty in 1998. Seven hun-
dred and eighty-three years separate these two treaties, yet the former can 
still give guidance for the development of the latter. I have been focusing on 
the importance of procedural matters in the reception and development of 
Magna Carta, and will here offer some suggestions about procedural matters 
at the ICC as well as other international institutions. There has been quite a 
lot of focus on procedural matters at the ICC itself, that is, concerning how 
prosecutions are to be run once a case lands at The Hague. I want to focus 
on a somewhat different matter, namely how to deal with cases that are un-
likely to make it to The Hague on substantive grounds, but which are none-
theless matters concerning which the ICC or some other international insti-
tution could begin to exercise some oversight over basic procedural rights 
protection.
The first matter to discuss is what might be called international ha-
beas corpus rights. The leading U.S. law hornbook on habeas corpus de-
scribes the unusual status of habeas in the U.S. as “a civil, appellate, equita-
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ble, common law, and statutory procedure.”49 Hertz and Liebman go on to 
explain that habeas corpus has become a broad “surrogate for Supreme 
Court review”50 of whether the petitioners “constitutional rights have been 
preserved.”51 Indeed, some courts and individuals have said that the right of 
habeas corpus is simply the right of due process of law.52
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), in its ap-
pellate decision in Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, declared that the right of 
habeas corpus “is a fundamental right and is enshrined in international hu-
man rights norms, including Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights . . . .”53 Yet currently, the right of habeas corpus is only recog-
nized by international tribunals and courts in a limited way. On May 23, 
2000, the ICTR held that: “the notion of habeas corpus at the international 
level is limited to a review of the legality of the detention” of those held by 
the ICC, seemingly not for those held in custody in other settings such as 
Guantánamo or Bagram.54
A second, and related, idea is to set up international institutions so 
that they act as much on considerations of equity as on statute. The chan-
cery courts in England developed into courts of equity, which sat alongside 
courts of common law. The Chancellor was considered the conscience of 
England. In a similar vein, one writer has proposed that we need an interna-
tional habeas corpus court that would be “the keeper of the world’s con-
science.”55
And in this respect, again returning to the Guantánamo case, it 
should not be allowed that an individual fall between the cracks of legal 
jurisdictions. The Bush administration declared that Guantánamo was a 
International criminal tribunals have seen themselves on this 
model, but have mainly restricted their role to prosecuting substantive mass 
crimes. I envision expanding this domain so that a range of serious viola-
tions of due process would also fall under the domain of these courts. Equi-
ty considerations would involve, among other things, egregiously unfair 
rulings by national tribunals and courts, along with denial of basic 
human rights.
49 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 7.
50 Id. at 23.
51 Id. at 86 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 
87–88 (1923)).
52 See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 20 (stating that habeas corpus is designed to 
ensure that “no arbitrary authority might act without warrant, or ‘due process of law’”) (quot-
ing In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas. 17, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8751)).
53 Case No. ICTR-97-99, ¶ 88 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda App. Chamber Nov. 3, 1999), 
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm
54 Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-1, ¶ 28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda 
Trial Chamber May 23, 2000).
55 LUIS KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS 14 (1962).
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black hole—where neither U.S. criminal law nor the Geneva Convention 
and other aspects of international law applied. In my view, this is the kind 
of unfairness that an international court of equity or similar international 
institution should take up, and where the purpose of such a proceedings is to 
fill the gaps that occur as we move very slowly away from a system of law 
completely dependent on States toward one that will someday, perhaps, be 
independent of States. 
A third new direction is for there to be international oversight and 
possibly prosecution of State leaders that violate nonrefoulement by engag-
ing in deportation of individuals to countries where they will be tortured or 
otherwise harmed, or who engage in extraordinary rendition of prisoners of 
war or others captured on the battlefield. There are international instruments 
that recognize the right of nonrefoulement, but they have not often been 
enforced, as was true at Guantánamo. In my view, what is needed is for an 
international court like the ICC, or some other international institution, to 
have this as part of its subject-matter jurisdiction as a way to protect some 
of the most vulnerable of people, those who are currently stateless. I would 
extend nonrefoulement further than it is recognized now, so that all refugees 
are under its purview.
A fourth new highly controversial direction is for international insti-
tutions to promote trial by jury. In many Western countries, trial by jury in 
criminal matters is an acknowledged right. And this is probably the most 
controversial of the four proposals I have put on the table. For there have 
not yet been major international instruments that have recognized trial by 
jury as a requirement of criminal proceedings. This was one of the lyn-
chpins of the evolving Magna Carta doctrine. It is my view that the right to 
trial by jury of one’s peers is crucial for justice. Yet today there are no in-
ternational jury trials, so this right is a long way from being recognized and 
enforced, although the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Boumediene v. 
Bush seems to be on the road to recognizing this as a universal right.56
As the development of the rights recognized in Magna Carta took a 
long time to be enforced in English courts, so I would envision a slow 
process of recognition and enforcement of these rights as properly enforced 
through international courts and other international institutions. Like the 
development of Magna Carta, this process will probably involve the exten-
sion of the reach of rights protections to an increasing circle of individuals. 
That the process will be slow, perhaps very slow, is no reason not to start 
working toward this eventual goal now. 
56 See 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2256 (2008). Kennedy cites Harlan’s concurring opinion in Reid v. 
Covert as criticizing In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), in wondering “whether jury trial 
should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of Congress’ power to provide for 
the trial of Americans overseas.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1955).
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I would think that the order of these rights is that habeas corpus and 
nonrefoulement are the ones that should be put first on the agenda today, 
with the others taken up in turn only as the international climate for such 
considerations changes over time. The first of these rights, habeas corpus (at 
least as a right to be brought out of secrecy and into visibleness), is already 
given some recognition by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whereas the 
fourth is not recognized by these instruments. Nonrefoulement and certain 
other equity considerations are recognized, but not currently enforced in an 
effective way. As international institutions move from the first to the fourth 
of Magna Carta legacy rights, we will move increasingly toward an interna-
tional rule of law and toward at least piecemeal cosmopolitanism.
VI. OBJECTIONS
Critics of my view have voiced the objection that I am engaging in 
a kind of cultural imperialism in assuming that what is good for certain 
Western countries should be simply applied whole-cloth to the rest of the 
world as well.57 This criticism is especially strongly put in the case of trial 
by jury, which is not recognized as an important right in most of the world 
at the moment. But this criticism has also been voiced about habeas corpus, 
which in its Western form at least is not recognized as an international right. 
The idea here is that various societies have gotten along quite well over the 
centuries, if not the millennia, with customary forms of procedure that are 
especially well suited to the cultural traditions of those societies.58
I agree that Magna Carta grew out of a particular set of cultural and 
social conditions in England in the late Middle Ages. But over time Magna 
Carta gave rise to a set of procedural norms that were adopted in diverse 
societies and that came to be the model for various international instruments 
that have been found acceptable by a significant proportion of the States in 
the world. Of course, this still could be said to put priority on what States as 
opposed to communities have found acceptable. But at least this is a start at 
trying to show that Magna Carta legacy rights I have been discussing are not 
merely acceptable to those in England who had already adopted many of 
Indeed, 
there is a sense that Magna Carta rights I have trumpeted grew out of a set 
of customs that were suited for situations in England. Why assume that this 
set of English practices should be applied to the rest of the world?
57 Leila Sadat has been an especially sharp critic of my view in this respect. Mark Drumbl 
and Helen Stacy have also voiced this criticism. I am grateful to them all for forcing me to 
see the importance of this point.
58 See Laura Grenfell, Legal Pluralism and the Challenge of Building the Rule of Law in 
Post-Conflict States: A Case Study of Timor-Leste, in THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
REBUILDING SOCIETIES AFTER CONFLICT: GREAT EXPECTATIONS, 157–76 (2009).
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these rights in their customs. In the end, the proof of the value of Magna 
Carta legacy rights is in the usefulness as protectors of substantive rights 
and as constituents in a reasonable conception of a minimalist international 
rule of law. 
The critique of cultural imperialism has also been raised against the 
human rights movement generally, not merely against those of us who are 
pushing for global procedural rights. In its most famous form, scholars from 
African and Islamic societies criticized human rights, especially social and 
cultural rights, as also imposing Western values on the rest of the world in a 
one size fits all manner. The criticism of cultural imperialism is especially 
apt, say my critics, since I rely on a specific historical document from so 
long ago to stand as a model for all of contemporary international law. In-
deed one scholar has said that all of international law is merely an attempt 
to “civilize” non-Western States in an especially harmful form of colonial-
ism.59
The larger criticism of the human rights movement is an interesting 
place to start in dealing with the more specific objection to my defense of 
Magna Carta legacy rights as international procedural rights. In an earlier 
work I tried to respond to this line of criticism at the beginning of my text-
book on applied ethics seen from a multicultural perspective. The first point 
to note is that a cultural diversity approach has the disadvantage that it has 
trouble strongly condemning practices such as female genital mutilation that 
have been supported by certain cultures. The point is that it is strongly 
counter-intuitive to allow cultural pluralism to dominate these debates about 
human rights so that no criticism is possible of a wrongful practice if it has 
support in a given society.
I will attempt to respond to this important line of criticism in the re-
mainder of this paper.
60
In the context of Magna Carta legacy rights, habeas corpus, and
nonrefoulement are especially prone to be denied in certain societies and yet 
their deprivation constitutes quite a serious wrong, perhaps a wrong on the 
same order as substantive wrongs such as genocide and crimes against hu-
manity. And the tendency to deny these rights is as true of Western as of 
non-Western States. It may well be true, as multicultural proponents such as 
John Mohawk have said, “that we are going to have make peace with those 
59 See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2002).
60 See Martha Nussbaum, Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Mutilation, in SEX 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 118 (1999), reprinted in APPLIED ETHICS: A MULTICULTURAL APPROACH
15–26 (Larry May, Shari Collins-Chobanian, and Kai Wong eds., 2006) [hereinafter APPLIED 
ETHICS].
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who are different from us.”61
Concerning habeas corpus in particular, I think that the cultural im-
perialism objection somewhat misses the mark. I am not necessarily advo-
cating that all of the world conform to the specific wording of this right that 
comes down to us from eight hundred years ago in a very particular histori-
cal context. The various components of a habeas corpus right are recognized 
by an assortment of international documents and customs. And there is a 
core minimalist right that is very hard to argue against in that it is so strong-
ly associated with giving minimal protection to a host of substantive rights 
that have garnered universal acceptability, such as rights against genocide, 
torture, and crimes against humanity. 
But it would completely upset the very idea of 
human rights as universally applicable if respecting difference means that 
serious wrongs cannot be criticized if a society disregards those rights for 
whatever reason, especially if the reason is not a good one.
There is another component of my response that is equally impor-
tant, namely, it is much harder to make cultural arguments against proce-
dural rights than against substantive rights.  Substantive considerations, 
such as that some individuals can be legitimately harmed for mating or 
coming-of-age rituals, are one thing, but it is hard to see what cultural tradi-
tions would be seriously offended if habeas corpus or nonrefoulement rights 
were to be protected globally. Rather than offending deep-seated cultural 
norms, it is far more likely that the objections will come from government 
leaders who find the increased transparency in their societies that comes 
from respecting procedural rights to be inconvenient or downright obstre-
perous in their attempts to suppress their populations. It is not my intention 
to argue against the need to consider contextual differences in the way that 
procedural rights are protected. But that certain procedural rights should 
achieve universal protection is not obviously opposed to cultural practices 
in the way that the similar protection of substantive rights has been opposed 
on cultural imperialism grounds.
A more practical variation of the cultural imperialism objection is 
that there may be other and even better ways to protect individuals than to 
insist that Magna Carta legacy rights are protected everywhere. I am not in 
principle opposed to the thrust of this variation of the cultural imperialism 
objection. I would, though, say two things. First, it is unclear to me what 
would be the specific cultural pluralism objection to habeas corpus that 
should cause one to back off from a full-throated defense of such rights at 
the global level. Second, I am certainly willing to accept cultural variations 
of these rights. My approach to these procedural rights leaves room for sig-
61 John Mohawk, Looking for Columbus: Thought on the Past, Present, and Future of 
Humanity, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE
443 (M. Annette Jaimes ed. 1992).
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nificant cultural variation. Indeed, my model is the complementarity prin-
ciple in international criminal law, where international institutions only get 
involved at all if it is clear that States are unwilling or unable to provide 
their own protection for the core of these rights. 
One last variation of the objection under consideration is that I have 
too closely allied myself with a “liberal” orientation to rights and am there-
by showing a theoretical bias that is open to cultural imperialism charges. 
My response here is simply to admit that my approach is quite broadly lib-
eral in the sense that I am working within a context of rights of individuals 
that is largely Western. But I would also point out, as others have as well, 
that most if not all major non-Western theoretical perspectives also are sup-
portive in principle of the kind of rights that form the background of my 
thinking about procedural issues.62
There is also a methodological variation of the above objection, 
namely that my approach is liberal and Western in that it is rationalistic 
rather than impressionistic, or some such. Again, it is unclear to me how my 
project can go forward in providing a philosophical analysis of procedural 
rights in international law if it were only impressionistic rather than rigo-
rously analytic. Nonetheless, I suppose I will simply have to accept this 
criticism, if anyone makes it, and acknowledge the limitations of my study 
as well as my own limitations as a thinker and writer. Nonetheless, I contin-
ue to think that my approach can have merit even if it displays some of the 
biases that I have attempted to address in this section. 
So, I am willing to take the cultural im-
perialism objection quite seriously, but fail to see it undermining the ap-
proach I adopt in this paper. 
Ian Langford has challenged the idea that there is anything univer-
sal to the idea of right to a fair trial, or to the use of the idea of fairness as 
involving specific procedures that must be followed.63
62 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam, Islamic Law, and the Dilemma of Cultural 
Legitimacy for Universal Human Rights, in ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 31
(Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Virginia A. Leary eds., 1990), reprinted in APPLIED ETHICS, supra 
note 60, at 101–10. See also Claude Ake, The African Context of Human Rights, in APPLIED 
Ethics, supra note 60, at 111–16; Joseph Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights 
for Contemporary China, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 212 (Joanne 
R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999), reprinted in APPLIED ETHICS, supra note 60, at 117–
32; Kenneth K. Inada, A Buddhist Response to the Nature of Human Rights, in ASIAN 
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 91 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. & Virginia A. Leary eds., 1990), 
reprinted in APPLIED ETHICS, supra note 60, at 133–42.
Langford argues that 
it is not even true that the idea of a fair trial is unique to all Western legal 
systems. Rather, he contends that this idea is only of very recent vintage 
even in Western societies. It is primarily a twentieth-century concept, and 
one that is confined to certain Western societies even today. On the basis of 
his empirical work on the usages of the idea of a fair trial, Langford con-
63 Ian Langford, Fair Trial: The History of an Idea, 8 J. HUM. RTS. 37, 37–52 (2009).
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cludes that “fair trial is like rugby, the boy scouts, and television, simply a 
diffused cultural trait.” The idea that there is an “inherent nature of human 
rights in all people is a kind of secular utopianism, an attempt to foist a sin-
gle ideology on the world.”64
Like many of the critics of the universality of human rights, Lang-
ford seems to confuse normative claims with empirical ones. Even if it were 
empirically true that specific human rights, such as the right to a fair trial, 
are only discussed in the West in the twentieth century, it does not follow 
that normatively the idea of a right to a fair trial is merely supported by a 
particular ideology. One could similarly show empirically that it was not 
until the late nineteenth century, and primarily in Western countries, that 
slavery was condemned as violating the rights of slaves. But this does noth-
ing to blunt the normative claim that slavery violates the rights of slaves. 
Universal normative truths are not dependent on their being recognized at 
all, although one hopes that once the case is made for particular rights that 
they will be seen as largely compelling. If there is anything utopian about 
claims concerning universal rights, it is mainly that they will indeed one day 
be so recognized by all people. But the normative status of such claims does 
not turn on empirical facts about the diversity of practices across cultures 
and times.
At the moment, the ICC has four substantive crimes as the basis of 
its jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
crime of aggression (the last is currently not operational because of a lack of 
consensus on what constitutes aggression). These crimes are very specifical-
ly defined and are only likely to be prosecuted when there has been a mass 
atrocity. In addition, the ICC is governed by the important principle of 
complementarity, which requires that the prosecutor can only take a case if 
the State that otherwise would have jurisdiction has refused or indicated that 
it cannot hear the case on its own. I see the global procedural justice rights
as a corollary consideration to the substantive rights already protected at 
the ICC.
In this paper I have been inspired by events nearly eight hundred 
years apart, the signing of Magna Carta, and the creation of the prison in 
Guantánamo Bay, to consider what might be significant in the piecemeal 
movement toward an international rule of law. Eight hundred years is little 
time in evolutionary terms, and in many ways it is little time in terms of 
legal progress. But perhaps the lessons learned from both events can propel 
us forward, incrementally, toward global procedural justice. And the place 
to start is in the interstices of procedure—procedures that were denied to 
those at Guantánamo.
64 Id. at 51. 
